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Ambushes
Avoiding the ambush
“The best way to survive an ambush is not to encounter it. In order for
this to happen, vehicle movement mustn’t be predictable in timing or
route, and should avoid the most obvious routes.”
Lt. Col. Kevin Stoddard, Soldiers handbook
Valuables distribution/collection
Urban environment, street network
Stable (ambush not pursuit)
Depot and banks are safe locations
Ambushes are prepared at nodes
Un-escorted armored vehicle, multiple
stops
Both deterministic and stochastic in nature.
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Data
Relevant information is:
d : the depot
B: set of banks
V : set of nodes V = N ∪B ∪{d}
E : set of edges (i , j), i ∈ N, j ∈ N
αj , j ∈ N: success rate of an ambush prepared at j
cij , (i , j) ∈ E : length of edge (i , j)
Modeling the attacker
The attacker as a feature of the environment (adaptation of Hazardous
material transportation concepts) Erkut and Verter (1998) and List et al.
(1991).
Model the risk as an accumulating metric over the course of a
vehicles route.
Search for dissimilar routes, Carotenuto et al. (2007)
Risk function
Risk
Occurrence Relevance
Attack Exposed value
Exposition Predictability
Location Duration Repetitions Sequences
.
Given a vehicle’s route r
Rr =∑
j∈r
∑
i∈N
Rtij ·αj or Rr =max
j∈r ∑i∈N
Rtij ·αj
where
Rtij = $ij ·Otij , Otij = β0 cijv +β1ptij
Predictability - time
1
β2
t tj−1tj−2
Historic data, symmetric fuzzy
set
H
∑
l=j−1
β3
|tj − tl |β2
Predictability - ordering
Given two routes r1, r2, similarity is measured by the Levenshtein
distance Sr1,r2
The higher the distance the more“dissimilar” the orderings
Model by β4 ·1/Sr1,r2
Advantages and critics of the environment-based
modeling
(+) All state-of-the-art techniques can be adopted from classic VRP.
(+-) The model is deterministic.
(-) Hazmat based predictability metrics are in fact predictable.
Modeling the attacker
Risk minimization models are acceptable against regular thieves
Modeling the attacker
ocean’s 11 - ambush planning
What about a smart robber? We assume full knowledge!
Modeling the attacker’s incentive
We explicitly model the robber as a player in a 2-player non-cooperative
game.
Assumptions:
Complete information on the network, including the access to
planning algorithms.
Ambush sites and vehicle paths are chosen before the vehicle departs
from the depot.
The robber is rational, and will maximize payoff.
One ambush site (a lonely gangster).
Bell (2004), Joseph (2005).
Modeling the attacker’s incentive - single OD
Let pij : flow over the link (i , j) ∈ E .
Success of ambush at node j :
rj = ∑
i∈N
(pij) αj
Robber’s payoff at j :
Rj = ∑
i∈N
(pij) αj ·$j
Robber’s goal:
Zr =max
j∈N ∑i∈N
(pij) αj ·$j
MinMax formulation - single OD
Our goal:
Zp =min
P
{
max
j∈N ∑i∈N
(pij) αj ·$j
}
p is a flow:
∑
i∈N
(pij) = ∑
k∈N
(pjk) ∀j ∈ N
∑
i∈V
(pib) = 1 ∑
j∈V
(pdj) = 1
0≤ pij ≤ 1 ∀(i , j) ∈ E
MinMax formulation - single OD
Given the optimal solution p∗:
p∗ij is used as probability of traversing edge (i , j).
A random path construction procedure is used to dynamically
determine the vehicle’s route: no critically vulnerable node
exploitable by an intelligent robber.
Flow circulation does not affect optimality (Joseph, 2005).
Implementation: add ε · ∑i∈N ∑j∈N pijcij to the objective.
Modeling multiple destinations
Flows on network do not model temporal considerations.
Route based formulation quickly explode in size w.r.t the size of the
street network and loose one level of “stochasticity”.
Two steps approach:
Decide the order of the banks to be visited
Adapt the flow-based model to multiple destinations
(multi-commodity flow or layered network)
Multi-commodity flow
Given an ordering O for the banks to be visited, we define |B|+1 commodities, one for each
OD pair in the vehicle’s journey.
As ambushes at j in different segments of the vehicle’s journey are mutually exclusive events,
the robber’s goal can be modeled as:
Zr =max
j∈N ∑b∈B ∑i∈N
(pbij ) α
p
j ·$pj
The minmax game is as follows:
Zp =min
P
{
max
j∈N ∑b∈B ∑i∈N
(pbij ) α
p
j ·$pj
}
s.t. p is a multicommodity flow
∑
i∈N
(pbij ) = ∑
k∈N
(pbjk ) ∀j ∈N,∀b ∈ B
∑
i∈V
(pb−1ij ) = 1, ∑
i∈V
(pbji ) = 1 ∀b ∈ B, j ∈Ob
∑
j∈V
(p0dj ) = 1, ∑
j∈V
(p
|B|
id ) = 1
0≤ pbij ≤ 1 ∀(i , j) ∈ E ,∀b ∈ B
Layered network
|B| copies of the network are
created
Linked with directed links, where
pjj ′ = 1, j ∈ O
Terminal arc pjd = 1, j ∈ O|B|, to
impose flow circulation
Both formulations have similar complexity
MinMax formulation
Given the optimal solution p∗:
pbij is used as probability of using edge (i , j) in the b-th part of the
vehicle’s journey.
Determine the bank ordering
We use an enumerative approach:
Let Θ be the set of possible orderings, |Θ|= |B|!
In real world |B| is hardly bigger than 6, thus 6! = 720
Using a path based approach, as in Bell (2004) with Ω the set of possible paths,
|Ω|= |V |!, where |V | can be easily order of hundreds or thousands.
We add a stochastic decision level using a mixed strategy for the orderings with
pr , r ∈Θ the probability of selecting the ordering r :
p∗r =
1− Z˜p(r)
∑Θk=1(1− Z˜p(k))
where Z˜p(r) is the normalized payoff
Preliminary results on Cambridge network
Considered by Joseph (2005), 50 nodes and 91 edges, LPs solved by
GLPK, algorithm coded in C
Performed experiments with 3 up to 6 banks, max runtime 120 seconds on
a laptop
Preliminary results on Cambridge network
Equal αj
Payoffs between 0.333 and 0.376
72.3 (63, 80) edges with positive flow
47.1 (43, 49) nodes with positive inflow, 27.0 (20, 32) with max payoff
Preliminary results on Cambridge network
αj increasing with distance from banks and depot
Payoffs between 0.262 and 0.504
62.0 (51, 70) edges with positive flow
43.6 (38, 48) nodes with positive inflow, 17.1 (11, 23) with max payoff
Advantages and critics of the minmax flow based
approach
(+) Unpredictable.
(+) Does not suffer from dimensionality.
(-) Deterministic constraints are difficult to model.
Conclusions and Outlook
Two models to deal with ambush avoidance for valuable transfer.
Direct modeling of robber’s incentives.
Applicable approach to real world.
Outlook
Relax restrictive hypoteses (rational robber, full information)
Consider multiple vehicles
Consider multiple ambush points
Model restrictions on vehicle routes
Value shading
The minmax approach limits the max payoff but this value shades the
“magnitude”of the total payoff.
Multi-objective optimization, solved in two steps:
Compute Z ∗p , with minmax
Redistribute the flow:
Up =min
P
∑
j∈N
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈N
(pbij) α
p
j ·$pj
s.t. ∑
b∈B
∑
i∈N
(pbij) αj ·$pj ≤ Z ∗p ∀j ∈ N,b ∈ B
p is a flow
Selecting the bank ordering
The formula proposed only approximates the best mixed strategy.
Indeed, a 2-player game for bank ordering, would be better.
We set up the following matrix game:
V
R S1 . . . Sr
S1 Z (S1) . . . U(S1,Sr )
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Sr U(Sr ,S1) . . . Z (Sr )
with U(S1,Sr )≤ Z (S1) and U(Sr ,S1)≤ Z (Sr ).
The game results in a system of linear equations order with |B|2 variables.
Reconsidering the assumption of mutual exclusive events
If ambushes at j are not mutually exclusive, then robber incentive is:
Zr =max
j∈N
B
∑
k=1
(
(−1)k−1 ∑
1≤i1<i2<···<ik≤n
ik
∏
i1
(pbj ) α
p
j ·$pj
)
Unfortunately no more a nice LP!
Alternative formulation
Let:
α˜j = 1−αj as the failure rate
p˜ij = 1−pij as probability of not passing by (i , j)
The robber will select j that minimize the failure
Zr =min
j∈N
(p˜j) α˜j
thus, for the multicommodity formulation,
Zr =min
j∈N∏B
(p˜bj ) α˜j
or, using“non”flow variables:
Zr =min
j∈N∏B ∑i∈N
(p˜bij ) α˜j
Alternative formulation
We obtain nash-equilibrium by maximizing the minimal failure
Zp =max
P
{
min
j∈N∏B ∑i∈N
(p˜bij) α˜j
}
todo what if we approximate Zp by the following LP?
Zp =max
P
z
s.t. z ≤ ∑
i∈N
(p˜bij) α˜j ∀j ∈ N,b ∈ B
p is a flow
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